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 Game-specific and Player-Specific Knowledge Drive Transfer of Learning 
Between Games of Strategic Interaction 
Michael G. Collins 
Ion Juvina 
Kevin A. Gluck 
 
Model Predictions 
In this document, we present all of the model predictions for an upcoming study to be to run in 
the Spring of 216. During this experiment, participants will sequentially play two games of 
strategic interaction for 50 rounds in one of four possible game orders, playing either iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) or iterated Chicken Game (CG) twice (PDPD or CGCG order) or 
playing each game once (PDCG or CGPD order). During each game, participants will play with 
a computerized confederate agent which uses a particular strategy, playing the first game of a 
condition using the T4T strategy and using the PT4T strategy during the second game 
(T4T_PT4T order) or vice versa (PT4T_T4T order). The trustworthiness of the confederate agent 
will remain constant over the course of both games, manipulated to be either high (HT) or low 
(LT) trustworthiness. Finally, the information that participants receive about confederate agents 
will be manipulated. Participants will be told that they will play both games with either the same 
participant (one-agent condition) or that they would be randomly paired with another participant 
to play with during the second game after the first game (two-agent condition). 
This document is organized into 32 sections, one for each of the experimental conditions, 
each with six different figures. The first graph of a section shows the smoothed round-by-round 
predicted proportion of each of the five game outcomes during a condition. The proportion of 
each outcome was smoothed to remove the round-by-round variability in the game’s outcomes 
and to allow the reader observe the general behavioral trends predicted by the model. Following 
the first figure of a section, five additional figures are presented, showing the actual round-by-
round predicted proportion of a single outcome over the course both games during condition, 
with 95% CI intervals.  
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Two Agent Conditions 
1. Two Agent: PDPD T4T PT4T HT  
 
Figure 1. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the PDPD T4T PT4T HT two agent condition.      
 
Figure 2. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent PDPD T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
Figure 3. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent PDPD T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 4. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the two agent PDPD T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 5. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the two agent PDPD T4T PT4T 
HT condition. 
 
Figure 6. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the alternation outcome over the course of the two agent PDPD T4T PT4T HT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Two agent: PDPD T4T PT4T LT Condition 
 
Figure 7. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the two agent PDPD T4T PT4T LT condition.      
 
 
Figure 8. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent PDPD T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
Figure 9. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent PDPD T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 10. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the two agent PDPD T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 11. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the two agent PDPD T4T PT4T 
LT condition. 
 
Figure 12. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the alternation outcome over the course of the two agent PDPD T4T PT4T LT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
3. Two Agent: PDCG T4T PT4T HT 
 
 
Figure 13. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the two agent PDCG T4T PT4T HT condition.      
 
Figure 14. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent PDCG T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 15. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent PDCG T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 16. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the two agent PDCG T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 17. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the two agent PDCG T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 18. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the alternation outcome over the course of the two agent PDCG T4T PT4T HT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
4. Two Agent: PDCG T4T PT4T LT 
 
Figure 19. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the two agent PDCG T4T PT4T LT condition.      
 
 
Figure 20. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent PDCG T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 21. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent PDCG T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
Figure 22. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the two agent PDCG T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 23. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the two agent PDCG T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
 Figure 24. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the alternation outcome over the course of the two agent PDCG T4T PT4T LT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Two Agent CGPD T4T PT4T HT  
 
Figure 25. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the two agent CGPD T4T PT4T HT condition.      
 
 
Figure 26. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent CGPD T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 27. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent CGPD T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
Figure 28. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the two agent CGPD T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 29. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the two agent CGPD T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
Figure 30. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the alternation outcome over the course of the two agent CGPD T4T PT4T HT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Two Agent Condition: CGPD T4T PT4T LT  
 
Figure 31. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the two agent CGPD T4T PT4T LT condition.      
 
Figure 32. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent CGPD T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 33. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent CGPD T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
Figure 34. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the two agent CGPD T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 35. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the two agent CGPD T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
Figure 36. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the alternation outcome over the course of the two agent CGPD T4T PT4T LT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Two Agent Condition: CGCG T4T PT4T HT 
 
Figure 37. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the two agent CGCG T4T PT4T HT condition.      
 
Figure 38. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent CGCG T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 39. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent CGCG T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
Figure 40. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the two agent CGCG T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 41. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the two agent CGCG T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
Figure 42. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the alternation outcome over the course of the two agent CGCG T4T PT4T HT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
8. Two Agent Condition: CGCG T4T PT4T LT  
 
Figure 43. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the two agent CGCG T4T PT4T LT condition.      
 
Figure 44. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent CGCG T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 45. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent CGCG T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
Figure 46. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the two agent CGCG T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 47. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the two agent CGCG T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
Figure 48. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the alternation outcome over the course of the two agent CGCG T4T PT4T LT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Two Agent Condition: PDPD PT4T T4T HT  
 
Figure 49. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the two agent PDPD PT4T T4T HT condition.      
 
 
Figure 50. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent PDPD PT4T 
T4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 51. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent PDPD PT4T 
T4T PT4T HT condition. 
 
Figure 52. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the two agent PDPD PT4T 
T4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 53. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the two agent PDPD PT4T T4T 
HT condition. 
 
Figure 54. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the alternation outcome over the course of the two agent PDPD PT4T T4T HT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
10. Two Agent Condition: PDPD PT4T T4T LT 
 
Figure 55. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the two agent PDPD PT4T T4T LT condition.      
 
Figure 56. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent PDPD PT4T 
T4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 57. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent PDPD PT4T 
T4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 58. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the two agent PDPD PT4T 
T4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 59. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the two agent PDPD PT4T T4T 
LT condition. 
 
Figure 60. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the alternation outcome over the course of the two agent PDPD PT4T T4T LT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
11. Two Agent Condition: PDCG PT4T T4T HT 
 
Figure 61. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the two agent PDCG PT4T T4T  HT condition.      
 
 
Figure 62. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent PDCG PT4T 
T4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 63. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent PDCG 
PT4T T4T HT condition. 
 
Figure 64. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the two agent PDCG PT4T 
T4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 65. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the two agent PDCG PT4T 
T4T HT condition. 
 
Figure 66. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the alternation outcome over the course of the two agent PDCG PT4T T4T HT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Two Agent Condition: PDCG PT4T T4T LT 
 
Figure 67. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the two agent PDCG PT4T T4T LT condition.      
 
Figure 68. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent PDCG PT4T 
T4T LT condition.  
 
 
Figure 69. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent PDCG 
PT4T T4T LT condition.  
 
Figure 70. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the two agent PDCG PT4T 
T4T LT condition.  
 
 
Figure 71. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the two agent PDCG PT4T 
T4T LT condition.  
Figure 72. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the alternation outcome over the course of the two agent PDCG PT4T T4T LT 
condition.  
 
 
 
 
 
13. Two Agent Condition: CGPD PT4T T4T HT 
 
Figure 73. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the two agent CGPD PT4T T4T HT condition.      
 
Figure 74. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent CGPD PT4T 
T4T HT condition.  
 
 
Figure 75. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent CGPD 
PT4T T4T HT condition. 
 
Figure 76. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the two agent CGPD PT4T 
T4T HT condition. 
 
Figure 77. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the two agent CGPD PT4T 
T4T HT condition. 
 
Figure 78. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent CGPD PT4T 
T4T HT condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. Two Agent Condition: CGPD PT4T T4T LT 
Figure 79. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the two agent CGPD PT4T T4T LT condition.      
 
 
Figure 80. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent CGPD PT4T 
T4T LT condition. 
 
Figure 81. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent CGPD 
PT4T T4T LT condition. 
Figure 82. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the two agent CGPD PT4T 
T4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 83. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the two agent CGPD PT4T 
T4T LT condition. 
 
Figure 84. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the alternation outcome over the course of the two agent CGPD PT4T T4T LT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
15. Two Agent Condition: CGCG PT4T T4T HT 
 
Figure 85. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the two agent CGCG PT4T T4T HT condition.      
 
 
Figure 86. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent CGCG PT4T 
T4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 87. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent CGCG 
PT4T T4T HT condition. 
 
Figure 88. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the two agent CGCG PT4T 
T4T HT condition. 
 
 
 
Figure 89. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the two agent CGCG PT4T 
T4T HT condition. 
 
Figure 90. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the alternation outcome over the course of the two agent CGCG PT4T T4T HT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
16. Two Agent Condition CGCG PT4T T4T LT 
 
Figure 91. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the two agent CGCG PT4T T4T LT condition.      
 
 
Figure 92. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent CGCG PT4T 
T4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 93. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the two agent CGCG PT4T 
T4T LT condition. 
 
Figure 94. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the two agent CGCG PT4T 
T4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 95. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the two agent CGCG PT4T 
T4T LT condition. 
 
Figure 96. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the alternation outcome over the course of the two agent CGCG PT4T T4T LT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
17. One Agent Condition: PDPD T4T PT4T HT 
 
Figure 97. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the one agent PDPD T4T PT4T HT condition.      
 
Figure 98. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent PDPD T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 99. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent PDPD T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 100. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the one agent PDPD T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 101. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the one agent PDPD T4T PT4T 
HT condition. 
 
Figure 102. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the alternation outcome over the course of the one agent PDPD T4T PT4T HT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
18. One Agent Condition: PDPD T4T PT4T LT 
 
Figure 103. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the one agent PDPD T4T PT4T LT condition.      
 
 
Figure 104. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent PDPD T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 105. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent PDPD T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
Figure 106. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the one agent PDPD T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 107. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the one agent PDPD T4T PT4T 
LT condition. 
 
Figure 108. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the alternation outcome over the course of the one agent PDPD T4T PT4T LT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19. One Agent Condition: PDCG T4T PT4T HT 
 
Figure 109. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the one agent PDCG T4T PT4T HT condition.      
 
Figure 110. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent PDCG T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 111. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent PDCG T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 112. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the one agent PDCG T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 113. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the one agent PDCG T4T PT4T 
HT condition. 
 
Figure 114. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the alternation outcome over the course of the one agent PDCG T4T PT4T HT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
20. One Agent Condition: PDCG T4T PT4T LT 
 
Figure 115. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the one agent PDCG T4T PT4T LT condition.      
 
Figure 116. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent PDCG T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 117. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent PDCG T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
Figure 118. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the one agent PDCG T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 119. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the one agent PDCG T4T PT4T 
LT condition. 
 
Figure 120. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the alternation outcome over the course of the one agent PDCG T4T PT4T LT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21. One Agent Condition: CGPD T4T PT4T HT 
 
Figure 121. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the one agent CGPD T4T PT4T HT condition.      
 
Figure 122. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent CGPD T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 123. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent CGPD T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
Figure 124. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the one agent CGPD T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 125. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the one agent CGPD T4T PT4T 
HT condition. 
 
Figure 126. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the alternation outcome over the course of the one agent CGPD T4T PT4T HT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
22. Two Agent Condition: CGPD T4T PT4T LT 
 
Figure 127. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the one agent CGPD T4T PT4T LT condition.      
 
 
Figure 128. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent CGPD T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 129. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent CGPD T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
Figure 130. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the one agent CGPD T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 131. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the one agent CGPD T4T PT4T 
LT condition. 
 
Figure 132. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the alternation outcome over the course of the one agent CGPD T4T PT4T LT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
23. One Agent Condition: CGCG T4T PT4T HT 
 
Figure 133. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the one agent CGCG T4T PT4T HT condition.      
 
 
Figure 134. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent CGCG T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 135. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent CGCG T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
Figure 136. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the one agent CGCG T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
Figure 137. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the one agent CGCG T4T 
PT4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 138. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the alternation outcome over the course of the one agent CGCG T4T PT4T HT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
24. One Agent Condition: CGCG T4T PT4T LT 
 
Figure 139. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the one agent CGCG T4T PT4T LT condition.      
 
 
Figure 140. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent CGCG T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 141. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent CGCG T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 142. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral defection outcome over the course of the one agent CGCG T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 143. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual defection outcome over the course of the one agent CGCG T4T 
PT4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 144. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the alternation outcome over the course of the one agent CGCG T4T PT4T LT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
25. One Agent Condition: PDPD PT4T T4T HT 
 
Figure 145. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the one agent PDPD PT4T T4T HT condition.      
 
 
Figure 146. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the mutual outcome over the course of the one agent PDPD PT4T T4T HT 
condition. 
 
 
 
Figure 147. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of the unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent PDPD PT4T 
T4T HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 148. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of unilateral defection outcome over the course of the one agent PDPD PT4T T4T 
HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 149. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of mutaul defection outcome over the course of the one agent PDPD PT4T T4T HT 
condition. 
 
Figure 150. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of alternation outcome over the course of the one agent PDPD PT4T T4T HT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26. One Agent Condition: PDPD PT4T T4T LT 
 
Figure 151. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the one agent PDPD PT4T T4T LT condition.      
 
Figure 152. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of mutual cooperation unilateral cooperation unilateral defection mutual defection 
alternation outcome over the course of the one agent PDPD PT4T T4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 153. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent PDPD PT4T 
T4T LT condition. 
 
Figure 154. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of unilateral defection outcome over the course of the one agent PDPD PT4T T4T 
LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 155. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of mutual defection outcome over the course of the one agent PDPD PT4T T4T LT 
condition. 
 
Figure 156. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of alternation outcome over the course of the one agent PDPD PT4T T4T LT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
27. One Agent Condition: PDCG PT4T T4T HT 
 
Figure 157. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the one agent PDCG PT4T T4T HT condition.      
 
Figure 158. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent PDCG PT4T T4T 
HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 159. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent PDCG PT4T 
T4T HT condition. 
 
Figure 160. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of unilateral defection outcome over the course of the one agent PDCG PT4T T4T 
HT condition. 
 
 
 
Figure 161. The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of mutual defection outcome over the course of the one agent PDCG PT4T T4T 
HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 162.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of alternation outcome over the course of the one agent PDCG PT4T T4T HT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
28. One Agent Condition: PDCG PT4T T4T LT 
 
Figure 163. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the one agent PDCG PT4T T4T LT condition.      
 
Figure 164.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of mutual cooperation unilateral cooperation unilateral defection mutual defection 
alternation outcome over the course of the one agent PDCG PT4T T4T LT condition. 
 
 
Figure 165.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent PDCG PT4T 
T4T LT condition. 
 
Figure 166.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of unilateral defection outcome over the course of the one agent PDCG PT4T T4T 
LT condition. 
 
Figure 167.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of mutual defection outcome over the course of the one agent PDCG PT4T T4T LT 
condition. 
 
Figure 168.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of alternation outcome over the course of the one agent PDCG PT4T T4T LT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29. One Agent Condition: CGPD PT4T T4T HT  
 
Figure 169. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the one agent CGPD PT4T T4T HT condition.      
 
 
Figure 170.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent CGPD PT4T T4T 
HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 171.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent CGPD PT4T 
T4T HT condition. 
 
Figure 172.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of unilateral defection outcome over the course of the one agent CGPD PT4T T4T 
HT condition. 
 
 
Figure 173.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of mutual defection outcome over the course of the one agent CGPD PT4T T4T 
HT condition. 
 
Figure 174.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of alternation outcome over the course of the one agent CGPD PT4T T4T HT 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
30. One Agent Condition: CGPD PT4T T4T LT 
 
Figure 175. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the one agent CGPD PT4T T4T HT condition.      
 
 
Figure 176.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent CGPD PT4T T4T 
LT condition.  
 
 
Figure 177.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent CGPD PT4T 
T4T LT condition.  
 
 
Figure 178.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of unilateral defection outcome over the course of the one agent CGPD PT4T T4T 
LT condition.  
 
 
Figure 179.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of mutual defection outcome over the course of the one agent CGPD PT4T T4T LT 
condition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 180.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of alternation outcome over the course of the one agent CGPD PT4T T4T LT 
condition.  
 
 
 
 
31.One Agent Condition:  CGCG PT4T T4T HT 
 
Figure 181. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the one agent CGCG PT4T T4T HT condition.      
 
 
Figure 182.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent CGCG PT4T T4T 
HT condition.  
 
 
Figure 183.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent CGCG PT4T 
T4T HT condition.  
 
Figure 184.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of unilateral defection outcome over the course of the one agent CGCG PT4T T4T 
HT condition.  
 
 
Figure 185.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of mutual defection outcome over the course of the one agent CGCG PT4T T4T 
HT condition.  
 
Figure 186.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of alternation outcome over the course of the one agent CGCG PT4T T4T HT 
condition.  
 
 
 
 
 
32. One Agent Condition: CGCG PT4T T4T LT 
 
Figure 187. Smoothed round-by-round proportion of the game’s five outcomes (Mutual 
Cooperation – CC, Unilateral Cooperation – CD, Unilateral Defection – DC, Mutual Defection – 
DD, and Alternation – ALT) during the one agent CGCG PT4T T4T LT condition.      
 
Figure 188.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent CGCG PT4T T4T 
LT condition.  
 
 
Figure 189.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of unilateral cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent CGCG PT4T 
T4T LT condition.  
 
Figure 190.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of unilateral defection outcome over the course of the one agent CGCG PT4T T4T 
LT condition.  
 
 
Figure 191.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of mutual cooperation outcome over the course of the one agent CGCG PT4T T4T 
LT condition.  
 
Figure 192.  The predicted round-by-round proportion (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals 
(dotted lines) of alternation outcome over the course of the one agent CGCG PT4T T4T LT 
condition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
